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Navigating the Vortex

Navigating the Vortex

著者： Lucy P. Marcus & Stefan Wolff
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 We live in a complex and ever-changing world. To navigate the vortex we must adapt to change quickly, think critically, and make sound decisions. Lucy Marcus & Stefan Wolff talk about business, politics, society, culture, and what it all means.

www.navigatingthevortex.comLucy P. Marcus & Stefan Wolff 政治・政府 政治学 経済学
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  • Amid an escalating air and ground war, talks between Russia and Ukraine yield no progress

    Amid an escalating air and ground war, talks between Russia and Ukraine yield no progress
    2025/06/04
    News of the spectacular “spiderweb” mass drone attack on Russian air bases on June 1 will have been uppermost in the minds of delegates who assembled the following day for another round of direct talks between Russia and Ukraine in Istanbul.The attack appears to have been a triumph of Ukrainian intelligence and planning that destroyed or damaged billions of pounds’ worth of Russian aircraft stationed at bases across the country, including at locations as far away as Siberia.Ukraine’s drone strikes, much like Russia’s intensifying air campaign, hardly signal either side’s sincere commitment to negotiations. As it turned out, little of any consequence was agreed at the brief meeting between negotiators, beyond a prisoner swap, confirming yet again that neither a ceasefire nor a peace agreement are likely anytime soon.As with the similarly inconclusive meeting between the two sides on May 16, the lack of progress is unsurprising. However, the broader context of developments on the battlefield and beyond offers important clues about the trajectory of the war in the coming months.At their earlier meeting in Istanbul in May, Moscow and Kyiv had agreed to draft and exchange detailed proposals for a settlement. The Ukrainian proposal reiterated the long-standing position of Kyiv and its western allies that concessions on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country are unacceptable.In other words, a Russian-imposed neutrality ruling out NATO membership and limiting the size of Ukraine’s armed forces as well as any international recognition of Moscow’s illegal land-grabs since the annexation of Crimea in 2014 are non-starters for Ukraine. While the Ukrainian proposal accepts a ceasefire along the frontline, it considers this only as “the starting point for negotiations” and demands that “territory issues are discussed only after a full and unconditional ceasefire.”In substance, this is very similar to Zelensky’s peace plan of late 2022 which failed to get broader traction outside the capitals of Ukraine’s western allies.The Russian proposals are also mostly old news. Moscow’s terms were only handed to Ukrainian negotiators at their meeting in Istanbul on Monday. Given what the Kremlin is reported to be asking for, this is unlikely to have made any difference to the possibility of meaningful discussions between the sides: the full recognition of Russian territorial claims since 2014, Ukrainian neutrality, and the stringent conditions set out for even a temporary ceasefire are hardly in any way more serious negotiation positions from Ukraine’s perspective than Kyiv’s proposals are likely to be to Moscow. In fact, what the Kremlin put on the table in Istanbul is more akin to surrender terms.Ukraine is in no mood or need to surrender. The wave of drone attacks targeted several airbases deep inside Russia on June 1, including some hosting parts of Russia’s strategic bomber fleet. But this, like previous drone strikes against Moscow in June 2023, is more of a symbolic morale booster than signalling a sustainable Ukrainian capability that could prove critical in evening out some of the advantages that Russia has over Ukraine in terms of material mass and manpower.Closer to the frontlines inside Ukraine, Kyiv’s forces also struck the power grid inside the Russian-occupied parts of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. This may have an impact on any Russian plans for an offensive to capture more of these two southern Ukrainian regions that Russia has claimed since sham referendums in September 2022 but still does not fully control. But much like the drone strikes deep into Russia, it is, at best, an operation that entrenches, rather than breaks the current stalemate.There is no doubt that Ukraine remains under severe military pressure from Russia along most of the more than 1,000km-long frontline. The country is also still very vulnerable to Russian air attacks. However, while Russia might continue to make incremental gains on the battlefield, a game-changing Russian offensive or a collapse of Ukrainian defences does not appear to be on the cards.Kyiv’s position will potentially also be strengthened by a new bill in the US senate that threatens the imposition of 500% tariffs on any countries that buy Russian resources. This would primarily affect India and China, the largest consumers of Russian oil and gas and could cut Russia off from critical revenues and imports — if New Delhi and Beijing decide that trade with the US is more important to them than cheap imports from Russia.Yet, US president Donald Trump, to date has been indecisive when it comes to putting any real, rather than just rhetorical pressure on his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin. It is, therefore, not clear whether the proposed senate bill will have the desired effect any time soon or at all.By contrast, European support for Ukraine has, if anything, increased over the past months. It still falls ...
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    7 分
  • Berlin steps up to replace Washington as guarantor of European security

    Berlin steps up to replace Washington as guarantor of European security
    2025/05/29
    Two statements from world leaders this week bear closer examination. On May 27, US president Donald Trump took to his TruthSocial social media channel to proclaim that if it wasn’t for him, “lots of really bad things would have already happened to Russia”. The following day the German chancellor, Friedrich Merz, announced that his country would assist Ukraine in developing long-range missiles to deploy against targets inside Russia. Both statements are quite extraordinary.Even by Trump’s own standards, the public declaration by a sitting US president that he is protecting the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, is unprecedented. Putin is an indicted war criminal who has been waging a war of aggression against Ukraine for more than three years after having illegally annexed Crimea over a decade ago. There can now be no doubt left that the US has become an unreliable ally for Ukraine and its European partners.This is the context in which Merz’s announcement of increasing defence cooperation with Ukraine becomes significant. While Trump continues to chase an impossible deal with Putin – even after threatening to abandon his mediation efforts less than ten days ago – Germany has doubled down on Ukraine’s defence.Not only that, but as the EU’s largest and Nato’s second-largest economy, Germany is now also aiming to turn its Bundeswehr into the “strongest conventional army in Europe”. Its most senior military officer, Carsten Breuer, has published plans for a rapid and wide-ranging expansion of defence capabilities.Germany is finally beginning to pull its weight in European defence and security policy. This is absolutely critical to the credibility of the EU in the face of the threat from Russia. Berlin has the financial muscle and the technological and industrial potential to make Europe more of a peer to the US when it comes to defence spending and burden sharing. This will be important to salvage what remains of Nato in light of a highly probable American down-scaling — if not complete abandonment — of its past security commitments to the alliance.After decades of failing to develop either a grand strategy to deal with Russia or the hard power capabilities that need to underpin it, achieving either will take some time. But it is important to acknowledge that some critical first steps have been taken by the new German government.For Germany, and much of the rest of Europe, the investment in more defence capabilities does not simply require producing more ammunition or procuring more advanced defence systems. These are important — but what is also needed is a significant investment in developing manpower. This means either finding more volunteers or reintroducing conscription, which is now no longer a taboo in Germany.Deploying a whole new brigade to Lithuania is an important signal to Nato allies about Germany’s commitment to the alliance. It is also a clear signal to Russia that Germany finally is putting its money where its mouth is when it comes to containing the threat from Russia, which has grown significantly since the beginning of the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.The three years of Russia’s war against its neighbour have also highlighted the threat that Russia poses beyond Ukraine’s borders. The war against Ukraine has exposed European vulnerabilities and its dependence on the United States. And it has taught military planners important lessons about what a likely future confrontation with Russia would look like. This is why Germany’s military planners have identified air defence systems, precision strike capabilities, drones, and electronic and cyber warfare assets as procurement priorities.Beyond Germany, the signs have been that Europe more broadly is beginning to learn to stand on its own feet when it comes to its security. For the continent, the challenge is threefold. It needs to beef up its defence spending in light of the ongoing war against Ukraine and Russian threats to expand it further. Europe also needs to come to terms with the dismantling of the transatlantic alliance by Trump. And, finally, there is a growing populist surge that threatens the very foundations of European democracy and has the potential to undermine European security and defence efforts. This has been given extra fuel by the alignment of Trump’s America-first Maga movement with Putin’s Russia.These are enduring challenges with no quick fixes. The first test of this apparent new-found European mettle will be the war in Ukraine. Giving Ukraine permission to use long-range missiles against targets in Russia is not a new development. Such a move was first taken by the then US president, Joe Biden, in November 2024 when he authorised Ukraine to launch limited strikes into Russia using US-made long-range missiles, followed by similar authorisations from London and Paris at the time, but not Berlin.Now, as then, how effective this will be depends not ...
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    7 分
  • For the sake of a reset with Russia, Trump has abandoned efforts to mediate peace in Ukraine

    For the sake of a reset with Russia, Trump has abandoned efforts to mediate peace in Ukraine
    2025/05/20
    After a phone call with Russian leader Vladimir Putin on May 19, US president Donald Trump took to social media to declare that Russia and Ukraine will “immediately start negotiations” towards a ceasefire and an end to the war. He did, however, add that the conditions for peace “will be negotiated between the two parties, as it can only be”.With the Vatican, according to Trump, "very interested in hosting the negotiations" and European leaders duly informed, it seems clear that the United States, and Trump personally, have effectively abandoned their stalled mediation efforts to end the war against Ukraine.It was always a possibility that Trump could walk away from the war, despite previous claims he could end it in 24 hours. This only became more likely on May 16, when the first face-to-face negotiations between Ukraine and Russia for more than three years predictably ended without a ceasefire agreement.When Trump announced shortly afterwards on his social media platform that he would be speaking to his Russian and Ukrainian counterparts by phone a few days later, he effectively mounted the beginning of a rearguard action. This was further underlined when US vice president JD Vance shortly before the Trump-Putin call explicitly told reporters that the US could end its shuttle diplomacy.The meagre outcomes of the talks between Russia and Ukraine — as well as between Trump and Putin — are not surprising. Russia is clearly not ready for any concessions yet and keeps insisting that Ukraine accept its maximalist demands of territorial concessions and future neutrality.Putin simultaneously continues to slow-walk any negotiations. After his call with Trump, he reportedly said that "Russia will offer and is ready to work with Ukraine on a memorandum on a possible future peace agreement", including "a possible ceasefire for a certain period of time, should relevant agreements be reached."The lack of urgency on Russia's part to end the fighting, and, in fact, the Kremlin's ability and willingness to continue the war, was underlined by the largest drone attack against Ukraine so far in the war on the day before the Trump-Putin call. Nor has there been any let-up in the fighting since. And the fact that Putin spoke to Trump while visiting a music school in the southern Russian city of Sochi further suggests that a ceasefire in Ukraine is not that high on the Russian leader's priority list.A large part of the Kremlin's calculation seems to be the desire to strike a grand bargain with the White House on a broader reset of relations — and to signal clearly that this is more important than the war in Ukraine and might even happen without the fighting there ending.This also still appears to drive thinking in Washington, with Trump foreshadowing an improvement in bilateral relations by describing "tone and spirit of the conversation" with Putin as "excellent". Following the two-hour conversation with his Russian counterpart, Trump also seemed excited about the prospects of "largescale trade" with Russia.Trump is on record as saying that there would be no progress towards peace in Ukraine until he and Putin would get together. Such direct interaction between the American and Russian presidents may well be critical to any progress in relations between the two countries. However, it is worth bearing in mind that very little movement towards a ceasefire in Ukraine, let alone a peace agreement, occurred after the previous phone call between the two presidents on February 12.Part of this lack of progress has been Trump's reluctance to date to put any real pressure on Putin. And despite agreement in Brussels and preparations in Washington for an escalation in sanctions against Russia, it is unlikely that Trump will change his approach. If anything, the outcome of this latest Trump-Putin call is an indication that Trump is prioritising the improvement of bilateral relations with Russia over peace in Ukraine.In this context, the sequence in which the calls occurred is also telling. Trump and Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, had a short call before the former spoke with Putin. Zelensky said he told Trump not to make decisions about Ukraine “without us”.But rather than presenting Putin with a clear ultimatum to accept the existing ceasefire proposal, Trump apparently discussed future bilateral relations with Putin at great length during their call — before informing Zelensky and key European allies that the war in Ukraine is now solely their problem to solve.This has certainly raised justifiable fears in Kyiv and other European capitals again that, for the sake of a reset with Russia, the US might yet completely abandon its allies across the Atlantic.However, if a reset with Russia at any cost really is Trump's strategy, it is bound to fail. As much as Putin seems willing to continue with his aggression against Ukraine, Zelensky is as unwilling to surrender. Where Putin can rely on China's continuing...
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    7 分

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