How do you consider the role of people within your barrier or critical control system - threat or adaptable strength?

What are some fallacies of human performance, like being unreliable bad apples, and how best to incorporate the strengths of people, while limiting performance variability?

Today's paper is from McLeod, R. W. (2017). Human factors in barrier management: Hard truths and challenges. Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 110, 31-42.

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More research at SafetyInsights.Org

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Are our use of reported injury measures, like TRIFR or LTIFR, 'good enough' representations, or beset with foundational statistical flaws?

Today's report is from Hallowell et al., 2020, titled 'The Statistical Invalidity of TRIR as a Measure of Safety Performance'. From the CSRA.

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Are our safety myths--like most accidents being the result of human error--holding back genuine improvement within safety?

Can myths like these actually hamper learning, and increase operational risk?

Today's article is from Besnard, D., & Hollnagel, E. (2014). I want to believe: some myths about the management of industrial safety. Cognition, Technology & Work, 16, 13-23.

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More research at SafetyInsights.Org

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We design, implement and certify our safety systems with best intentions. We hope these systems help us to identify and address workplace hazards.

However, is it possible that certified management systems can instead mask particular complex sociotechnical issues, simplifying psychosocial matters into neat, auditable matters, devoid of their depth and nuance?

Can auditing transform functional systems into easily auditable, but less functional, systems?

Today we explore the following paper: Hohnen, P., & Hasle, P. (2011). Making work environment auditable–A ‘critical case’ study of certified occupational health and safety management systems in Denmark. Safety science, 49(7), 1022-1029.

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More research at SafetyInsights.Org

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Is Zero Harm a laudable approach or a misdirection--an illusion--associated with higher fatality rates?

This episode dives into the paper from: Sherratt, F., & Dainty, A. R. (2017). UK construction safety: a zero paradox?. Policy and practice in health and safety, 15(2), 108-116.

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More research at SafetyInsights.Org

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Are our investigations blinded to the functioning and effectiveness of risk controls?

Are our current approaches, and mental models about how safety events occur, defined less by what they unpack and more by what they leave in the dark?

This study unpacks these questions, and evaluates how accident investigators consider, or not, the functioning of risk controls within the context of investigations.

Ref: Dodshon, P., & Hassall, M. E. (2017). Practitioners’ perspectives on incident investigations. Safety science, 93, 187-198.

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More research at SafetyInsights.Org

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Are audits effective checks and verifications of our risk control systems?

Are they diving deep into the functionality and effectiveness of systems and practices, and evaluating actual daily, hazardous work?

Or, are they mostly rustling paperwork at the expense of real operational hazards?

Ref: Hutchinson, B., Dekker, S., & Rae, A. (2024). Audit masquerade: How audits provide comfort rather than treatment for serious safety problems. Safety science, 169, 106348.

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Conventional logic suggests that we fix the gaps that we find in investigations. But is this the case?

Is the investigation process more a socially constructed game of sociopolitical whack-a-mole, finding and fixing the things that are easily solved or understandable, or tolerable to the organisation?

Lundberg, J., Rollenhagen, C., & Hollnagel, E. (2010). What you find is not always what you fix—How other aspects than causes of accidents decide recommendations for remedial actions. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 42(6), 2132-2139.

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More research at SafetyInsights.Org

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